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Case Comment: British Columbia (Attorney General)
v. Brecknell
David TS Fraser*
In a day and age where a large portion of both innocent and criminal
communications travel across the border and then reside on servers outside of the
country, many Canadian police and prosecutors were understandably excited by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Brecknell.1 This case
concludes that a Canadian court can order an entity that is only ‘‘virtually
present” to produce records pursuant to a Criminal Code2 production order.
While it is a case that deals with a compelling issue faced by Canadian law
enforcement in an environment where hundreds of such orders are issued naming
US companies and are generally followed by them,3 the decision is wrongly
decided for a number of reasons. The British Columbia Court of Appeal erred in
determining that a legal person who solely has a ‘‘virtual presence” in Canada is,
in law, ‘‘present in Canada” for the purposes of the Criminal Code. In addition,
the Court of Appeal misapplied the existing authorities on domestic and
international law to determine that the Criminal Code has extraterritorial effect.
Finally, an ex parte appeal that departed significantly from our adversarial
system should be of questionable precedential value.
The procedural history of Brecknell is interesting and informative. The
RCMP were looking for data from Craigslist, a US company. Craigslist advised
the police that they would provide the requested data if the RCMP obtained a
production order.4 With this statement, Craigslist essentially said they would
*
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David TS Fraser is a partner with McInnes Cooper and a part-time faculty member of the
Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. He has advised and represented
numerous non-Canadian service providers in responding to Canadian civil, criminal and
national security legal processes. Given David’s membership on the editorial board of
this journal, it should be stated that this article was subject to independent peer review.
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Brecknell, 2018 BCCA 5, 2018 CarswellBC 15
(B.C. C.A.) [Brecknell].
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
For example, between January and June 2019 Twitter received 45 Canadian legal
demands for user information: Twitter, ‘‘Transparency Report” (accessed 18 March
2020), online: https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/ca.html. During the same
period, Google received 343 such demands: Google, ‘‘Transparency Report” (accessed
18 March 2020), online: https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?hl=en&user_requests_report_period=series:requests,accounts;authority:CA;time:&lu=user_requests_report_period, and Facebook received 697: Facebook,
‘‘Transparency” (accessed 18 March 2020), online: https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests/country/CA. These voluntary ‘‘transparency reports”
do not break down whether the demand was via a production order, made in exigent
circumstances or using some other form of process.
Brecknell, supra note 1 at para. 13.
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voluntarily comply with a Canadian order, rendering much of the analysis in
Brecknell superfluous obiter. The RCMP first applied to a provincial justice for a
production order naming Craigslist. They were rejected and told to provide the
court with evidence that the company has an office in British Columbia or some
other authority to support their application against a US company. Instead of reapplying to the same judge, the RCMP made a new application to the provincial
court arguing that Equustek (B.C.C.A.)5 meant that the court had jurisdiction
to grant the order. The Provincial Court refused the order, noting that Equustek
(B.C.C.A.) was a civil case, and that jurisdiction in that case was granted by
operation of a provincial statute.6 The Crown then sought judicial review of the
denial, unopposed and ex parte, to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The
Supreme Court dismissed the application and the Crown appealed again to the
British Columbia Court of Appeal. By that time, the application for the
production order had been refused three times by three different levels of court.
Finally successful at the Court of Appeal, the Crown stopped appealing. Until
the case hit the Court of Appeal and an amicus was appointed by the Court, all of
the proceedings were ex parte and unopposed. Despite this case raising important
jurisdictional and international law questions that the lower courts consistently
answered against the Crown, there was nobody to seek leave from the Supreme
Court of Canada to have the questions definitively answered. This raises some
important procedural issues that are beyond the scope of this comment, but the
Crown’s ability to appeal and appeal unopposed until they get they answer they
are looking for is inherently problematic.

1. CANADIAN LAW DOES NOT OPERATE EXTRATERRITORIALLY
UNLESS PARLIAMENT SPECIFICALLY SAYS SO
In the Brecknell decision, the B.C. Court of Appeal acknowledges that it is
settled law that Canadian statutes do not have extraterritorial effect unless
Parliament specifically provides for it. Despite this, the Court of Appeal did not
identify any signal from Parliament that it was intended to have effect outside of
the country. From Brecknell:
The need to interpret the section in light of restrictions placed on
extraterritorial effects is uncontroversial. The fundamental principles
were canvassed in R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26. There, Justice LeBel
identified a number of settled but important principles. First, customary international law, which has been adopted domestically, limits the
actions a state may legitimately take outside its borders. Customary
international law is based on respect for the sovereignty and equality of
5

6

Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2015 BCCA 265, 2015 CarswellBC 1590 (B.C. C.A.),
affirmed Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 CarswellBC 1727, 2017
CarswellBC 1728 (S.C.C.) [Equustek (B.C.C.A.)].
Specifically, the court referred to the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act,
S.B.C. 2003, c. 28.
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foreign states. Sovereign equality commands non-intervention and
respect for the territorial sovereignty of foreign states. Nonetheless,
Parliament may legislate ‘‘extraterritorially” in violation of those
principles provided it does so expressly: see paras. 35-46.7

Despite correctly reciting the Supreme Court’s conclusion in R. v. Hape,8 the
Court did not identify any manner in which Parliament indicated its intention
that production orders operate extraterritorially. In fact, Justice Harris
acknowledged that there is nothing in the production order provisions of the
Code indicating any parliamentary intention towards extraterritoriality. It is a
fundamental principle of Canadian law that Parliament has to expressly provide
for extraterritoriality in a statute,9 but that is absent. This concern is even more
acute in the search and seizure context. The Court in Hape observed:
The theoretical and practical impediments to extraterritorial application of the Charter can thus be seen more clearly where the s. 8
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is in issue than
where the issue relates, as in the cases discussed above, to the right to
counsel. Searches and seizures, because of their coerciveness and
intrusiveness, are by nature vastly different from police interrogations.
The power to invade the private sphere of persons and property, and seize
personal items and information, is paradigmatic of state sovereignty.
These actions can be authorized only by the territorial state. From a
theoretical standpoint, the Charter cannot be applied, because its
application would necessarily entail an exercise of the enforcement
jurisdiction that lies at the heart of territoriality. As a result of the
principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and comity, Canadian
law and standards cannot apply to searches and seizures conducted in
another state’s territory.10

Parliament does, from time to time, pass laws that have extraterritorial
effect: Parliament amended the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act with
Bill C-44 in 2015 to extend CSIS’s jurisdiction to investigate and collect
information outside of Canada.11 Similarly, Parliament added provisions to the
Income Tax Act dealing with foreign-based information and a limited piercing of
the corporate veil to obtain foreign-based information, as was seen and applied
in eBay Canada Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue.12 Parliament has even gone
so far as to amend the Criminal Code to make sure that if a Canadian on the
international space station murders another person, that is deemed to take place
7
8
9
10
11

12

Brecknell, supra note 1 at para. 23.
R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, 2007 CarswellOnt 3563 (S.C.C.) [Hape].
Ibid at para. 53.
Ibid at para. 87 (emphasis added).
Bill C-44, An Act to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other Acts,
2d Sess., 45th Parl, 2015, passed as S.C. 2018, c. 9.
eBay Canada Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 2008 FCA 348, 2008 CarswellNat
3980 (F.C.A.) [eBay Canada].
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in Canada so the accused can be brought before a Canadian court.13 Presumably
crimes by Canadian astronauts are rare, but Parliament turned its mind to the
possibility. It is hard to imagine that Parliament was not aware of the possibility
of relevant evidence being held outside of Canada by a non-Canadian company.
Even if Parliament thought of this, it must be stated expressly to give effect to
this impulse.
The only mention of territoriality included by Parliament with respect to
production orders is at s. 487.019(2) in the Criminal Code, which only speaks to
provinces within Canada:
The order has effect throughout Canada and, for greater certainty, no
endorsement is needed for the order to be effective in a territorial
division that is not the one in which the order is made.

The only mention of territoriality is confined to Canada, which leads to the
conclusion that Parliament did not grant world-wide effect.14
The Brecknell Court clearly finds the law’s emphasis on territorial location of
things (including data) to be impractical in this digital age when data can move
easily across borders and can exist in multiple places at the same time, where the
nature of the information is of much greater importance than its location. 15 The
Court later emphasises that legitimate investigations can be thwarted by the
movement of data, either malevolently at the behest of criminals or innocently as
part of the operations of service providers.16 As a policy proposition this is fine,
13

14

15
16

See Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 7(2.3): 7(2.3) Despite anything in this Act or any
other Act, a Canadian crew member who, during a space flight, commits an act or
omission outside Canada that if committed in Canada would constitute an indictable
offence is deemed to have committed that act or omission in Canada, if that act or
omission is committed(a) on, or in relation to, a flight element of the Space Station; or(b)
on any means of transportation to or from the Space Station.
Canada could have followed the lead of the United Kingdom when it enacted the Data
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (U.K.), c. 27, which amended the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (U.K.), c. 23, to expressly provide for investigatory
court orders with extraterritorial effect. Here is what was added to the warrant provisions
of that Act:(2A) A copy of a warrant may be served under subsection (2) on a person
outside the United Kingdom (and may relate to conduct outside the United Kingdom).Our Criminal Code does not contain any language that is akin to the language
added to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) related to search and
seizure powers.Similarly, the United States Congress amended the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2712 (2012) [S.C.A.], via the CLOUD Act, being Division V of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, to include the following
provision: §2713 A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing
service shall comply with the obligations of this chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose
the contents of a wire or electronic communication and any record or other information
pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such provider’s possession, custody, or
control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located
within or outside of the United States. [emphasis added]
Brecknell, supra note 1 at para. 46.
Ibid at para. 57.
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but international law of jurisdiction is inherently territorial in nature. The law
related to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is even more territorial. States do
treat data as being territorially located and are resistant to intrusions upon their
territorial sovereignty by way of evidence-gathering by other states. One may, at
one point, have a situation where data is both ‘‘here and there,” 17 but in this case
the data was entirely ‘‘there” and not ‘‘here.” If we are to interpret statutes so as
to avoid breaches of international law (which we must do), close attention needs
to be paid to the international law on point.
The court in Brecknell relied on eBay Canada, in which the Federal Court of
Appeal took a similar policy-based approach but failed to deal with the
international law on point in any depth (presumably because it was not raised). It
is important that the provision of the Income Tax Act at issue in the eBay Canada
case specifically provides for demands that can be served on non-residents of
Canada provided they are carrying on business in Canada: ‘‘. . . Minister may . . .
require that a person resident in Canada or a non-resident person carrying on
business in Canada provide any foreign-based information or document.” 18
As required by the canons of statutory interpretation, Parliament had
expressly granted the Minister of National Revenue the power to make demands
on non-residents that have extraterritorial effect. That is not the case with the
production order powers under the Criminal Code. It is also notable that the
organizations subject to the order in the eBay Canada case, namely eBay Canada
Limited and eBay CS Vancouver Inc., were physically present in Canada and
actually had custody or control of the data. In fact, they used the data in Canada
in the course of their business in Canada.
It appears that the Court in Brecknell dodged the question by creating the
proposition that the production order was not really extraterritorial because
Craigslist was effectively ‘‘present in Canada” by being virtually present in the
province. ‘‘Virtual presence” is an invention of the Court of Appeal. The
Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda raised the caution flag about this sort of
assertion:
Carrying on business in the jurisdiction may also be considered an
appropriate connecting factor. But considering it to be one may raise
more difficult issues. Resolving those issues may require some caution
in order to avoid creating what would amount to forms of universal
jurisdiction in respect of tort claims arising out of certain categories of
business or commercial activity. Active advertising in the jurisdiction
or, for example, the fact that a Web site can be accessed from the
jurisdiction would not suffice to establish that the defendant is carrying
on business there. The notion of carrying on business requires some form
17

18

See Society of Composers, Authors Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 2004 CarswellNat 1919 (S.C.C.) at paras. 58-59, and
quoted in eBay Canada, supra note 12 at para. 17.
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) at s. 231.6(2), cited in eBay Canada, supra
note 12 at para 28.
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of actual, not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as
maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the territory of the
particular jurisdiction. But the Court has not been asked in this appeal
to decide whether and, if so, when e-trade in the jurisdiction would
amount to a presence in the jurisdiction. With these reservations,
‘‘carrying on business” within the meaning of rule 17.02(p) may be an
appropriate connecting factor.19

This was recently followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Sgromo v.
Scott, also in the civil context:
[8] Mr. Sgromo made the same submission before the motion judge in
both the Bestway and Polygroup actions. In each case the motion judge
rejected his submission. In the Polygroup action the motion judge wrote
at paras. 33-34:
In Van Breda, at para. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada stated
that caution must be exercised in considering whether an entity is
carrying on business in the jurisdiction, to avoid what would
amount to assuming universal jurisdiction in respect of tort claims
arising out of certain categories of business or commercial activity.
‘‘The notion of carrying on business requires some form of actual,
not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining
an office or regularly visiting the territory of the particular
jurisdiction.”
Although retailers in Ontario may carry Polygroup products, and
although Polygroup therefore did business with Ontario retailers, this
does not mean that Polygroup carried on business in Ontario. For
Polygroup to carry on business in Ontario, it would require a finding that
Polygroup had some form of actual presence in the Province.
[9] And in the Bestway action the same motion judge wrote at paras. 6768:
Mr. Sgromo submits that the Bestway companies are carrying on
business in Ontario because their products are sold at retailers in
Ontario. In Van Breda, at para. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that caution must be exercised in considering whether an
entity is carrying on business in the jurisdiction, to avoid what
would amount to assuming universal jurisdiction in respect of tort
claims arising out of certain categories of business or commercial
activity. ‘‘The notion of carrying on business requires some form of
actual, not only virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as
maintaining an office or regularly visiting the territory of the
particular jurisdiction.”

19

Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2012 SCC 17, 2012 CarswellOnt 4268 (S.C.C.) at para.
87 (emphasis added).
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There is no evidence that the Bestway companies had such an actual
presence in Ontario, even if their products were sold in the province by
third party retailers, as alleged by Mr. Sgromo.
[10] We agree with each of these passages. We add that in Van
Breda, at para. 87, LeBel J. emphasized that even active advertising
in Ontario would not be enough to establish that a defendant was
carrying on business here.20 [emphasis added]

Questions related to jurisdiction under international criminal law are much
stricter than under private international law.21 But even under the flexible civil
rules, a ‘‘virtual presence” is insufficient to ground jurisdiction.

2.

ENFORCEMENT DOES ACTUALLY MATTER

The Brecknell court also makes the mistake of setting aside and underplaying
the inability to enforce any resulting order against Craigslist:
[51] While I recognize that there may be difficulties in enforcing a
production order in circumstances such as this, I do not think those
difficulties deprive the court of jurisdiction to issue the order. In my
view, the comments of Justice Groberman in Equustek are apt:
[85] Once it is accepted that a court has in personam jurisdiction over a
person, the fact that its order may affect activities in other jurisdictions
is not a bar to it making an order.
...
[97] Apart from the issue of comity, Google also argues that the order
that was made is unenforceable. It takes umbrage with the trial judge’s
suggestion (made at paras. 96 and 97 of her judgment) that Google
might be prevented from using the courts of British Columbia as a
penalty for non-compliance with the order.
[98] I tend to agree with Google that barring it from access to the courts
of the Province would be a draconian step, and not one that needs to be
contemplated at this juncture. Given that Google does business in the
Province, however, British Columbia courts are entitled to expect that
it will abide by their orders. It is also likely that, in the event of noncompliance, there will be consequences that can be visited on the
company.

20

21

Sgromo v. Scott, 2018 ONCA 5, 2018 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 8-10
(emphasis added).
Compare, for example, Equustek to Hape.
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[99] Google’s arguments do not persuade me that there is either a
jurisdictional or practical bar to the granting of an injunction of the
sort pronounced by the chambers judge. . .
[52] In my view, problems of enforceability may often need to be
considered when courts make discretionary decisions, since that issue is
relevant to the exercise of its discretion. Those difficulties do not,
however, deprive the court of jurisdiction to make the order.22

Equustek was a civil injunction application where jurisdiction was specifically
granted by the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act,23 not an order
under the Criminal Code. When the case came before the Supreme Court of
Canada,24 Justice Abella repeatedly referred to Mareva injunctions and Norwich
orders which have extraterritorial effects (both of which are civil tools), but never
once referred to criminal investigation tools.25 Criminal and civil law are
completely different beasts, as far as any extension beyond borders is concerned.
In a case where Craigslist agreed to comply with a production order
(presumably with an understanding from the police about the nature of the data
being sought), it is very easy to disregard enforcement of the order. Enforcement
in such a case becomes entirely academic and one can conclude that Craigslist
essentially acceded to the court’s jurisdiction.
It is a mistake to conflate and confuse private international law with public
international law, particularly as it pertains to the international law of criminal
jurisdiction. In the criminal law context, a court cannot simply say it has
jurisdiction over the activity (or even the person) so that is sufficient to issue an
order extending outside of the territory of Canada. The issuance of the order is,
in and of itself, an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. Projecting that outside
Canada — absent clear authority from Parliament — is contrary to international
law and Canadian domestic law.26 The Supreme Court of Canada was clear in
Hape that enforcement jurisdiction is essential for the extraterritorial application
of Canadian law unless the legislature provides otherwise: ‘‘. . . Canadian law
cannot be enforced in another state’s territory without that state’s consent.” 27
22
23
24

25

26

27

Equustek (B.C.C.A.), supra note 5 at paras. 51 — 52.
Supra note 6.
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34, 2017 CarswellBC 1727 (S.C.C.)
[Equustek (S.C.C.)].
It should be noted that the Attorney General of Ontario, in its intervention in Equustek
(S.C.C.), invited the Supreme Court to consider and even rule upon whether criminal
investigation tools can extend outside of Canada, but the Court declined to comment on
this: ibid (Factum), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/
36602/FM075_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Ontario.pdf>.
See Robert J. Currie, ‘‘Cross-Border Evidence Gathering in Transnational Criminal
Investigation: Is the Microsoft Ireland Case the ‘Next Frontier’?” (2017) 54 Can YB Int’l
L 63, online: <https://doi.org/10.1017/cyl.2017.7>.
Hape, supra note 8 at para. 85.
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Justice Noël applied these well-established principles in X (Re) to deny CSIS
a warrant with extraterritorial effects, and observed:
[139] Lastly, in Hape, LeBel J set out the different types of jurisdiction
applicable to the question of extraterritoriality of laws. Particularly
important to the case at hand, is the concept of enforcement
jurisdiction, which is described as the State’s power to use coercive
means to uphold and give effect to its domestic laws. Under the
umbrella of enforcement jurisdiction, is found the investigative
jurisdiction, which refers to the power of law enforcement to investigate
matters as to give effect and uphold a state’s domestic law (Hape at
para 58). In customary international law states may not exercise their
enforcement jurisdiction in any form on the territory of another state
unless based on an international custom or convention. If a state does not
obtain consent for exercising its powers on a foreign states territory, such
an act would constitute a violation of territorial sovereignty and
international law. Therefore, any extraterritorial application of a
domestic law in a foreign country, without permission or without
ground in international law, can be seen as a violation of territorial
sovereignty. As stated by LeBel J in Hape:
65 The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Lotus
case, at pp. 18—19, that jurisdiction ‘‘cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention”. See also Cook, at para.
131. According to the decision in the Lotus case, extraterritorial
jurisdiction is governed by international law rather than being at the
absolute discretion of individual states. While extraterritorial jurisdiction [. . .] exists under international law, it is subject to strict limits
under international law that are based on sovereign equality, nonintervention and the territoriality principle. According to the principle of
non-intervention, states must refrain from exercising extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction over matters in respect of which another state
has, by virtue of territorial sovereignty, the authority to decide freely and
autonomously (see the opinion of the International Court of Justice in
the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua, at p. 108). Consequently, it is a well-established principle
that a state cannot act to enforce its laws within the territory of another
state absent either the consent of the other state or, in exceptional cases,
some other basis under international law. See Brownlie, at p. 306;
Oppenheim’s International Law, at p. 463. This principle of consent is
central to assertions of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. 28

Of further assistance is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Cook,
referred to by Justice Noël. In that case, it was clearly stated that one state
cannot exercise its enforcement jurisdiction on the territory of another state.:
28

X (Re), 2018 FC 738, 2018 CarswellNat 4748 (F.C.) at para. 139, affirmed 2018
CarswellNat 6763, 2018 CarswellNat 8970 (F.C.A.) (emphasis added).
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26 . . . In essence, the principle of the sovereign equality of states
generally prohibits extraterritorial application of domestic law since, in
most instances, the exercise of jurisdiction beyond a state’s territorial
limits would constitute an interference under international law with the
exclusive territorial jurisdiction of another state. The Permanent Court
of International Justice in The Case of the S.S. ‘‘Lotus” (1927), P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A, No. 10, at pp. 18-19, articulated this principle as follows:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law
upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory
of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue
of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a
convention.
...
. . . all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these
limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
27 From the general principle stated in The S.S. ‘‘Lotus” that the basis
of a State’s jurisdictional competence is territorial, it follows that an
attempt to apply domestic law beyond Canada’s borders results in
‘‘extraterritoriality”, defined by James R. Fox, in the Dictionary of
International and Comparative Law (2nd ed. 1997), at p. 106, as the
‘‘operation of laws upon persons or rights existing beyond the
territorial limits of the state enacting such laws”. The respondent
argues that, in accordance with the prohibition under international law
against the extraterritorial application of domestic laws, the Charter
cannot apply at all beyond Canada’s territorial boundaries. In our
view, although territory is clearly a critical element in determining the
scope of a state’s jurisdiction, territory alone is not determinative of
jurisdictional competence under international law. There are some
circumstances where the application of Canadian law to an undertaking
by Canadian law enforcement authorities on foreign territory can be
grounded on other jurisdictional principles, and will not result in an
objectionable interference with the exercise of foreign jurisdiction.29

A production order is an extension of enforcement jurisdiction. Absent the
provision that it is an offence not to comply, it is merely a request. To paraphrase
the SS Lotus decision quoted in Cook, a production order is an exercise of power.
To adopt the definition of ‘‘extraterritoriality” used in Cook, a production order
29

R. v. Cook, 1998 CarswellBC 2001, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (S.C.C.). The majority concluded
that the Charter applies to the actions of Canadian detectives in interviewing the accused
in the United States and the application of the Charter in such cases does not interfere
with the sovereign authority of the U.S.
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is an operation of Canadian laws upon persons or rights existing beyond the
territorial limits of Canada. The offense for failing to comply is the sine qua non
of the order and cannot be detached from the order itself. There is no principled
manner in which the Criminal Code can be read to permit a Canadian court to
issue an order with such extraterritorial effects.
To the author’s knowledge, the only other time this question has led to a
reported decision is that written by Judge Gorman of the Newfoundland and
Labrador Provincial Court. Judge Gorman refused to issue a production order
naming Facebook, concluding that he lacked jurisdiction to do so and that
Brecknell was wrongly-decided.30

3. THE IMPACT OUTSIDE OF CANADA NEEDS TO BE
CONSIDERED
One important issue that did not arise before any level of court in Brecknell,
but will likely come up if Brecknell is applied in the future is the fact that
American companies are often prohibited by the domestic law from complying
with foreign court orders.
American tech companies, from whom Canadian law enforcement often
attempt to obtain evidence, are US residents. It is axiomatic that a United States
resident is required to comply with United States law. Of particular interest in
this context, but never mentioned in the Brecknell decision, is the Stored
Communications Act,31 which regulates the circumstances under which an
‘‘electronic communications service provider” can disclose information related to
its account-holders.32
In general terms, the S.C.A. distinguishes between two categories of
information: ‘‘content” information and ‘‘non-content” information. Content
information would be the contents of a communication, such as an email, a text
message, or an instant message. Non-content information would be information
such as basic subscriber information, a customer’s name, backup email address,
and some metadata that does not reveal the substance of a communication.
If a U.S. resident were to provide the content of communications to
Canadian police pursuant to a criminal code production order, it would be in
violation of US law.33
30

31
32

33

In the Matter of an application to obtain a Production Order pursuant to section 487.014
of the Criminal Code of Canada, Re, 2018 CarswellNfld 19 (N.L. Prov. Ct.).
S.C.A., supra note 14.
For a more learned overview of the S.C.A. see: Kerr, Orin S., ‘‘A User’s Guide to the
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending it” (2004) 72
George Washington L. Rev. 1208.
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §2702, where none of the exceptions contemplate non-U.S. court
orders except those within the ambit of a CLOUD Act executive agreement: (a)
Prohibitions.—Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—(1) a person or entity
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge
to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that
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The impact of the S.C.A. on U.S. providers was never brought up in
Brecknell. As Craigslist had said they would provide the data if the police
provided a production order, it presumably did not prohibit the disclosure of the
data being sought by the RCMP.34 There was no consideration of the impact of
the order on the other side of the border.

3.1 A Canadian production order naming a non-Canadian company offends
comity
A Canadian production order directed at a non-Canadian company offends
comity and sovereignty. The United States has absolute sovereignty over what
takes place within its territory and what searches can be carried out on its
territory. No law of Canada can change that and while Parliament can pass laws
that offend international law, it is clear from the language of the Criminal Code
that the Parliament of Canada has not attempted to do so.
Despite this apparent impasse, there exists a pathway through which
Canadian investigators can obtain information from the United States, which
was negotiated between the two countries, and is used on a regular basis: the
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and Canada. 35

34

35

service; and (2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is
carried or maintained on that service—(A) on behalf of, and received by means of
electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing of
communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or
customer of such service; (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer
processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to
access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services
other than storage or computer processing; and (3) a provider of remote computing
service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not
including the contents of communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2)) to any
governmental entity.
It appears that the information sought under the Brecknell production order was
information respecting the identity of the person who posted certain advertisements on
the Craigslist service, so the Stored Communications Act prohibitions respecting content
would not have come into play. From Brecknell, supra note 1 at para. 8: The production
order sought relates to records of a specific Craigslist posting made in the province. The
RCMP also seeks the following information from Craigslist:a. the user’s name or
physical address;b. the user’s email address;c. the IP address assigned to the user when
the post was created;d. phone numbers used to verify the user account;e. dates and times
for the creation of the post; andf. the record of the posting.
It is unclear what (f) refers to. If it is non-content information, it would not be subject to the
content limitations in the SCA. This is in contrast to this instant case, where the S.C.A.
specifically prohibits the disclosure of the content information, even if a Canadian court orders
its disclosure.

Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 18 March 1985, Can TS 1990
No 19.
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Canada would be offended if a foreign government were to order a Canadian
company to hand over data in violation of Canadian privacy law. It would be
equally offended if the order was made simply for the convenience of the foreign
law enforcement when it could work with the Canadian government to obtain
what it seeks.
The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly stated that one country can only
extend its criminal investigations into another’s territory on invitation. Mutual
legal assistance is such an invitation — a common, negotiated exception — to the
absolute sovereignty of nations. In Zingre, Justice Dickson wrote:
As that great jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, observed in Schooner
Exchange . . . the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute, susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself, but common interest impels sovereigns to mutual
intercourse and an interchange of good offices with each other.
It is upon this comity of nations that international legal assistance rests.
Thus the Courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and
judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation
but out of mutual deference and respect. A foreign request is given full
force and effect unless it be contrary to the public policy of the
jurisdiction to which the request is directed . . . or otherwise prejudicial
to the sovereignty or the citizens of the latter jurisdiction.36

This is not unique to the United States. Canada also has ‘‘blocking statutes.”
An analogue may be the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act that permits the
blocking of non-Canadian orders for the production of information. 37 Similarly,
the Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act prohibits a
public body in Nova Scotia or a service provider of such a public body from
disclosing ‘‘personal information” in response to a ‘‘foreign demand for
disclosure.”38 Canadian sovereignty would be offended if a foreign tribunal
were to penalize a Canadian entity for following these laws.

3.2 Canadian courts consistently will not order anyone to violate another
country’s laws
It is well settled in Canadian law that a court will not order anyone to violate
another country’s laws. This is the unambiguous conclusion made by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Frischke, where an Ontario court was asked to require a
Panamanian employee of a Royal Bank affiliate to provide documents in
violation of that country’s laws. The Ontario Court of Appeal said that this is
simply not done:
36

37
38

R. v. Zingre, 1981 CarswellMan 142, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.) at paras. 17-18, at 400
[S.C.R.].
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29.
S.N.S. 2006, c. 3.
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An Ontario Court would not order a person here to break our laws, we
should not make an order that would require someone to compel
another person in that person’s jurisdiction to break the laws of that
state. We respect those laws. The principle is well recognized.39

Even exigency cannot justify such an order:
. . . Certainly, urgency alone cannot create its own rules, in the face of
established principles. We cannot speculate as to how the matter would
be regarded in Panama. We note that there is a Court in that
jurisdiction that has the power to authorize the production of the
information requested, and perhaps an application should be made to
that tribunal rather than circumvent its authority.40

This principle was more recently canvassed in TD Bank, N.A. v. Lloyd’s
Underwriters. In that case, the court wrote that comity is of particular
importance with the United States:
. . . Comity is a value that runs deep on both sides of our border and is the
product of a very long, peaceful and cooperative history and common legal
culture. The US is by no means the only jurisdiction to whom we ordinarily
extend comity, but it can perhaps be considered to occupy a pre-eminent
ranking in the list.41

4. MECHANISMS EXIST THAT WILL PERMIT ACCESS TO DATA
CONSISTENT WITH CANADIAN, UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
One country can only extend its policing powers into another state with the
permission of that state. This is clear, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Hape:
... However, in light of the foregoing discussion of the jurisdictional
principles of customary international law, the prohibition on interference with the sovereignty and domestic affairs of other states, and
this Court’s jurisprudence, Canadian law can be enforced in another
country only with the consent of the host state.42

Both Canada and the United States, through the Treaty Between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, have agreed to a mechanism that
permits Canadian police to obtain data from U.S. companies in a manner that it
consistent with Canadian and international law. This is a reciprocal arrangement
based on mutuality and consent, which is a hallmark of international law.
39
40
41

42

Frischke v. Royal Bank, 1977 CarswellOnt 281, 17 O.R. (2d) 388 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 26.
Ibid at para. 27.
TD Bank, N.A. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2016 ONSC 4188, 2016 CarswellOnt 10373 (Ont.
S.C.J.) at para. 17, additional reasons 2017 CarswellOnt 5657 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Hape, supra note 8 at para. 68 (emphasis added).
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Through official channels, and subject to approval of both the Canadian and
American governments, Canadian legal demands can be converted to a U.S.
court order, which satisfies the S.C.A. Until a CLOUD Act agreement is in place
between the two countries for mutual recognition of such orders, the MLAT is
the sole means by which the governments of both Canada and the United States
have chosen to address cross-border evidence gathering.43

5.

CONCLUSION

Despite the compelling policy arguments that Canadian courts should be
able to issue orders that require service providers to disclose records related to
offences involving Canadians that arise in Canada, the reality of both domestic
and international law prevent Canadian courts from issuing such orders.
Canada’s parliament has unquestioned authority to create laws that violate
international law and offend comity, but it has not done so. Furthermore, the
notion of a ‘‘virtual presence” was a fabrication of the court that is contrary to
existing principles of international law, both private and public.

43

The CLOUD Act, among other things, creates a regime in which the U.S. government
can enter into executive agreements with other states with the effect that certain U.S.
orders will be recognized in those other states and certain orders for the production of
evidence will not encounter the same U.S. legal barriers under the S.C.A.

